This study presents a fresh perspective, presenting an analysis of the political evolution of three social movements and their human rights platforms through the framework of social movement theory. Globalization and Political Ethics. Editors: Richard Day and Joseph Masciulli. Rational exercise of our responsibility requires us to relate the globalization process to the ends and purposes that properly befit human life and human community. Economic 'ends' are merely the 'means' to ends of a higher order, which can only be specified in terms of moral duty and ethical purpose. The contributors to this book explore political-ethical issues of globalization, including terrorism, institutional change and distribution in the world economy, the role of the United Nations and international financial institutions, the regimes of international trade and technology transfer, the effects of regionalism in the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the failure of Russia, human rights enforcement in Africa, and the prospects for global governance.
This book was originally published as Volume 4 no. While in the days of the Cold War models of citizenship were relatively clear-cut around the contrasting projects of reform and revolution, in the last three decades Latin America has become a laboratory for comparative research. The region has witnessed both a renewal of electoral democracy and the diversification of experiments in citizen representation and participation. The implementation of neo-liberal policies has led to countervailing transformations in democratic citizenship and to the rise of populist leaderships, while the crisis of representation has been accompanied by new forms of participation, generating profound transformations.
The authors analyze these recent trends, reflected in new forms of populism, inclusion and exclusion, participation and alternative models of democracy, social insecurity and violence, diasporas and transnationalism, the politics of justice and the politics of identity and multiculturalism. Building on the launch of the ASEAN economic community, the conference also created a new institute to promote convergence. Consistent with the findings in this article, these two strategic choices reflected an understanding of the ongoing wariness of top-down approaches that challenge sovereignty as well as the relative acceptability of changes that promote commercial activity, as opposed to, say, human rights protections.
In the much-heralded Asian century, many have argued that Asian states deserve greater representation in the institutions of global governance. That wish is clearly going to be fulfilled. Assumptions that the status quo can continue indefinitely are overly optimistic. Yet suggestions that Asian states will abandon the structures of international order are also overblown.
More likely is a larger convergence, an adaptation of existing structures and norms to the new reality — evolution rather than revolution. Not all of this will be positive. Though the chances of a radically different approach to global governance seem remote, the traditional view of sovereignty espoused by many Asian states may slow the expansion of human rights and other norms, although it does not look set to reverse them completely. Nor will any change necessarily be coherent.
Greater involvement of Asian states will primarily increase pluralism in the international order. And so the category remains a useful one, as the various countries experiment with stronger regionalism, as seen in ASEAN and its various extensions, and in taking a leadership role, most prominently in the case of China. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Sign In or Create an Account.
Sign In. Advanced Search. Article Navigation. Close mobile search navigation Article Navigation. Volume Article Contents. Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Cite Citation. Permissions Icon Permissions. Abstract Asian states are the least likely of any regional grouping to be party to most international obligations or to have representation reflecting their number and size in international or ganizations. View large Download slide. Table View Large. For the purposes of this article, the 53 members of the Asia-Pacific Group at the United Nations UN will be used unless otherwise indicated.
Rousseau, The Social Contract  , bk 2, ch. Mill ed. See generally G. See, e. Bell ed. Oppenheim, International Law , vol. But cf. Roos, Japan in den grooten Oceaan , at See generally S. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume 7: Road to Victory, — , at Charter of the United Nations. Thus, colonialism is a word of the past. It does not afflict the contemporary world. For an extreme version of this thesis, see G. Friedman and M. Lebard, The Coming War with Japan See P. King Fairbank ed. Wong, supra note 40, at —; Gong, supra note 9, at Belgium proceeded to submit the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice PCIJ , which indicated provisional measures, but ultimately withdrew the matter.
Fassbender and A. Walters, A History of the League of Nations , at Tanaka, T. McCormack and G. Keenan and B. Brown, Crimes against International Law , at vii. See generally H. A related argument might be made concerning the role of international law in addressing nuclear weapons testing and counter-proliferation in the Asian region.
It is also telling that Asia was the last region to have any meaningful network of international law scholars until the Asian Society of International Law was established in Beeson and R. Stubbs eds , Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism See S. Chesterman, From Community to Compliance? The last four secretaries-general have been from China — , Kazakhstan — , Kyrgyzstan — and Russia — See Figure 1 in this article.
The same appears to be true in the area of international tax agreements. Data compiled from www. Foot, S. MacFarlane and M. Mastanduno eds , U. This is not, of course, limited to international law. Peerenboom ed. Temple of Preah Vihear Cambodia v. The total of 88 includes Kiribati, which is not a member of a UN regional group. When Is Asia? Byers and G. Sornarajah and J. Mahbubani and S. See supra note On the evolution of the doctrine of responsibility to protect, see L. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Sidhu et al. Sidhu, P. Mehta and B. Right of Passage over Indian Territory Portugal v.
GA Res. Jayakumar, T. Koh and R. Talmon and B. There have been suggestions, however, that China is asserting sovereignty over the airspace above the artificial islands. Glaser, Testimony before the U. PCA, Philippines v. Lo and M. Data compiled from voting records available at www. Vetoes cast by end of Data compiled from UN Department of Peacekeeping, available at www. PCA, Philip Morris v. Cooper, J. Heine and R. Disclosure: the author was a member of the organizing committee for the conference and is a vice president of the Singapore Academy of Law.
Email: chesterman nus. Many thanks to Melbourne Law School, the National University of Singapore, Renmin University of China Law School, Shanghai Jiaotong University and the United Nations University in Tokyo for enabling me to present drafts of this material, and to the various colleagues, students and an onymous referees who commented on it.
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Article activity alert. Receive exclusive offers and updates from Oxford Academic. Taiwan was the first government to occupy one of the Spratly islands the largest such island, Taiping or Itu Aba, in and other claimants began to establish a presence from the early s. Vietnam now occupies twenty seven of the features, the Philippines eight, China seven, Malaysia five and Taiwan one.
Littoral states also claim maritime jurisdiction over areas of the Sea, which under the UN Law of the Sea can give them rights to fish, mineral and petroleum resources. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam claim maritime rights from their coasts. China and Taiwan also claim maritime rights on the basis of features in the Paracels and Spratlys. Considerable ambiguity surrounds some of the claims in the South China Sea.
There is also a lack of clarity over competing claims. The South China Sea has been a rich source of fish resources. Over five million tonnes of fish are harvested annually, which has constituted about 25 per cent of the protein requirements of the population of Southeast Asia. China took advantage of the weak position of the South Vietnamese Republic of Vietnam Government to seize full control over the Paracels in The growing competition for influence in the Spratlys resulted in a serious clash between Vietnamese and Chinese naval forces in March , when 64 Vietnamese and six Chinese sailors were killed and two Vietnamese vessels were sunk.
For some years after tensions in the area abated but have risen again since Several factors have contributed to the rise in disputation. One major factor in recent tensions has been diplomatic disputes associated with resource development. Most claimants to the South China Sea have interests in maximising their access to maritime resources including oil and gas Brunei is already a very wealthy state through its own petroleum resources.
From the mids, Vietnam expanded efforts to develop offshore petroleum resources in areas it considered as coming within its legitimate EEZ. The Commission reviews and can provide assessment of claims by states to extended continental shelf rights beyond nautical miles. The deadline for submissions acted as a catalyst for claimant states to declare their interests in the area and to contest the claims of other parties.
Taylor Fravel has stated:. A second factor has been the pattern of major power competition for influence in East Asia. China, as has been noted, claims a large area of the South China Sea.
ASEAN and regional cooperation: recent developments and Australia’s interests
China in recent years has increased the size and capacity of a number of maritime agencies which operate in the area. It has also enhanced its capacities for the exploration of resources, for example by unveiling a large offshore drilling unit. These have included additional surface ships and submarines, an aircraft carrier purchased from the Ukraine, which is being prepared for service and a major naval base on Hainan Island.
These have included restrictions on fishing by other states including Vietnam , the authorisation of petroleum exploration in areas claimed by other states as falling within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones and the harassment of foreign vessels conducting seismic surveys or oil exploration. The US does not take any position on the contending claims to the Sea. However, it has affirmed its interests in the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation and unimpeded international commerce through the Sea.
However, while the US has affirmed the importance of international law, it has not yet itself ratified the UN Law of the Sea convention. Japan has moved to provide some diplomatic support to Southeast Asian states in their territorial disputes with China; it has also agreed to provide the Philippines with up to ten vessels for its Coast Guard and is expected to expand security dialogue and cooperation with Vietnam.
Other factors have also fuelled tensions. In addition to China, other claimant states have moved to upgrade their defence capabilities. Vietnam is acquiring additional naval vessels including six submarines and improved command and control capacities, which will give it greater capacities beyond its coast line; the Philippines is also upgrading its forces, albeit from a modest base. Overall, the tensions in relation to the South China Sea are not considered to have advanced to the levels which existed between and , but the contests for influence are of substantial concern to regional states, and to ASEAN.
Four members of the Association are claimants in the area and Indonesia has also been affected by claims, but the other five members are not. This lack of consensus stems from differing national interests and their varied relationships with China. Over the past two decades, ASEAN has sought to pursue dialogue and reduce tensions in the area, but with limited success. They considered a range of issues and put forward proposals for conflict reduction and cooperation in areas which did not involve sovereignty claims.
The Declaration advocated measures including the development of confidence-building measures, the maintenance of freedom of navigation at sea and in the air, and the conduct of negotiations in regard to international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCLOS in particular. The Declaration did not deal with sovereignty questions and did not attempt to establish any sanctions for breach of its terms.
ASEAN subsequently had great difficulty in trying to move beyond this non-binding declaration. The Guidelines opened the door for discussion on cooperation projects in areas such as search and rescue and marine conservation. However, the proposals do not appear to have gathered any momentum and none of the cooperative projects have yet been put in place. ASEAN faced further challenges on these issues in China had agreed in principle to discuss such a code with ASEAN in late but it changed its position in July , when the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that talks could begin only when conditions were ripe.
It reaffirmed the value of the Declaration. The statement did not explicitly mention the issue of a binding code of conduct. It will not be clear for some time what prospects the Philippines has in relation to the case and an outcome would not be expected for several years. The impact of the decision is not yet clear.
At the time of writing September , prospects for progress in reducing tensions in relation to the South China Sea continued to be uncertain. Brunei is a wealthy state with wide diplomatic networks. The fact that China had agreed to discussions on South China Sea issues at a multilateral level has been seen as a positive step but the potential for progress remains unclear. In a potentially positive step, China affirmed its willingness to hold discussions with ASEAN officials on a code of conduct.
While the talks were seen as a positive step, tensions between China and the Philippines continued over disputed territorial claims, with the latter arguing that China was seeking to consolidate its presence in the area of Scarborough Shoal by deploying a series of concrete blocks that might be a prelude to the building of installations to support an enhanced presence in the area.
While discussions continue, the potential dangers of tension and possible clashes of interests in the South China Sea are substantial. In early May, the death of a Taiwanese fisherman after a clash between a Philippines Government vessel and a Taiwanese fishing boat, in an area disputed between both parties, emphasised again the potential for incidents to occur which can easily raise tensions.
While few observers predict a major conflict in the South China Sea, ongoing tensions continue to breed suspicions, worst case scenario thinking, arms build-ups and regional instability. ASEAN has consistently had a membership which is very diverse in political character. As has been noted above, a key purpose of the Association has been to enable countries with widely varying political systems to be able to find and maintain common ground in regional cooperation.
In this context, it may be suggested, the developments in Myanmar have been of particular significance for ASEAN as a regional grouping. Since the elections, the country has been undergoing a striking process of change. For many years after the military assumed control in a coup, Myanmar also widely referred to by its former name, Burma remained in a condition of relative isolation, with poor standards of governance and economic management.
Elections were held in and were won by the National League for Democracy NLD led by the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi, but the military subsequently did not concede power and maintained its dominant position. ASEAN pursued a cautious policy of engagement with Myanmar but hopes for political liberalisation were not realised.
In a low point was reached in ASEAN-Myanmar relations after the regime repressed demonstrations led by Buddhist monks amid substantial violence in which over seventy people were killed. A new constitution was introduced which contained provisions which seemed aimed at preserving a central role for the military. Elections were duly held in November but restrictions placed on the major opposition party, the National League for Democracy, and the continued house arrest of its leader Aung San Suu Kyi, led to considerable scepticism about how much change the elections would actually produce.
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In fact, the elections were followed by an unexpected and striking process of liberalisation. One week after the elections, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. The government began to hold regular consultations with Ms Suu Kyi, laws were adapted to allow demonstrations and enable workers to organise and strike, and substantial numbers of political prisoners were released. In a further notable move, the government held a number of by-elections on 1 April for 43 seats in the national lower and upper houses of parliament and for two in provincial assemblies.
A managed float for the currency was introduced, to supplant the former pattern of multiple exchange rates which discouraged investment and growth. Some reform has been pursued in the banking sector, engagement with international financial institutions has been active and additional foreign investment has been encouraged.
While the process of change so far has been very encouraging, substantial challenges continue. It will not be easy to pursue economic and social reforms when administrative resources are limited after decades of neglect and under-funding. While economic change has been very evident in urban areas, conditions for much of the rural poor have not yet begun to change significantly. Myanmar has many ethnic minorities and serious conflict has continued in some areas, for example in Kachin state.
Further inter-ethnic strife occurred in Rakhine State from late May when there was serious violent conflict involving the minority Rohingya community who are Muslims and Buddhists in the area. A government inquiry estimated that people died and tens of thousands were displaced. Additional ethnic violence occurred in early between Muslims and the majority Buddhist communities in central Myanmar. In March, at least 43 people died and over 10, were displaced after riots in the town of Meikhtila near Mandalay. Further violence between Buddhists and Muslims occurred in May in Lashio in Shan state: the violence has been associated with the activities of radical Buddhist clergy, who have promoted discrimination against Muslims in Myanmar.
The ethnic violence in Myanmar has aroused widespread concern both internationally and in Southeast Asia; there have been instances of tensions and some violence in both Indonesia and Malaysia, where there have been concerns that radical Muslims may attempt to exploit the problems in Myanmar to gain additional support. Myanmar also faces major challenges in managing ongoing political change at the national level.
National elections are planned for and the NLD is considered to be a leading contender, especially after its success in the April by-elections. Aung San Suu Kyi could also be a major contender to compete for the presidency, although changes to the Constitution would be required to enable her to be a candidate.
The “ASEAN Way”: The Structural Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement | Foreign Policy Journal
This will place Myanmar in a high profile position in regional affairs at a time when its complex processes of change are still underway. Pavin Chachavalpongpun Kyoto University has highlighted some of the key issues arising:. For Burma, it comes in advance of general elections scheduled for , just the third national elections since and the first since significant reforms began.
The process of change since has overall been a positive development for Myanmar and for ASEAN but it is still underway. Continuation of progress will clearly be an important issue for the Association. As has been noted above, the ASEAN members did not seek to develop an extensive multilateral institutional structure anything like that of the European Union. The role of the Secretariat and the Secretary-General were reaffirmed in the ASEAN Charter of but discussion has continued on whether the Secretariat may need to be developed further. The paradox of ASEAN is that while it has yet to accomplish most of its community-building goals, it has continued to embark on new and more ambitious initiatives without mobilizing adequate resources or strengthening its institutions.
How long it can continue to do this is an open question. As a regional grouping with a high international profile, ASEAN has attracted interest from other neighbouring states. Given the challenges which ASEAN experienced after the phase of enlargement in the s, particularly in relation to Myanmar, the Association has been cautious about considering any further increase in membership. Papua New Guinea has a strong identification with Melanesia and the South Pacific but it also adjoins Indonesian provinces in western Papua. Timor-Leste is a functioning democracy and it has a profitable oil and gas sector.
The country also has substantial problems of socio-economic development to address and it experienced significant internal political conflict in Concerns have been expressed about whether it would have the necessary technical and administrative capacities to handle the very large numbers of ASEAN meetings held each year and whether it could handle the demands and issues raised by the ASEAN Economic Community proposal.
Under the ASEAN Charter, a consensus is required for acceptance of a new member and the issue is still under consideration. It involves geopolitics. It remains uncertain when the Association will develop the required unanimous agreement on this issue. Since then, interactions have been advanced by successive governments. Australia in the s had a substantial interest in the conflict over Cambodia and ultimately played a significant role in helping to develop avenues towards a peace process, which led to United Nations intervention — , UN-conducted elections and the formation of a new government.
From the mids, Australia pursued an interest in closer association with ASEAN in economic and trade cooperation although accord took some time to develop. Cooperation on security issues expanded with the ASEAN countries in the wake of terrorist attacks internationally and in Southeast Asia from From a phase of further substantial cooperation developed. This step paved the way for Australia to be accepted as a founding member of the East Asia Summit in December These annual consultations at foreign minister level have been supplemented by meetings of officials particularly through the Australia-ASEAN Forum.
This represented There was a total of , enrolments by students from ASEAN countries in higher education in Australia in the decade from to Aid continues to be a significant element in both humanitarian assistance and in helping to build the skills, infrastructure and institutions which can support further growth. It also funds some ASEAN technical specialists, who are helping to enhance economic project management skills and processes within the Secretariat. The first such symposium in Jakarta, 19 September brought together over participants from the public and private sectors, academics, civil society organisations and the media.
The Australian Government has sought to enhance the prospects for trade with the ASEAN region through pursuit of both bilateral and multilateral agreements. A further major step in trade promotion has been the conclusion of a multilateral agreement between Australia and New Zealand and the ten ASEAN members. Substantial negotiations took place under the Howard Government and an agreement was inaugurated under the Rudd Government. As a living document, the Agreement brings to a new height the level of cooperation and relationship between the governments of ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand as well as its peoples.
The “ASEAN Way”: The Structural Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement
The Australian Government has identified several key elements in the Agreement which can benefit Australian traders: extensive tariff reductions and elimination commitments; regional rules of origin which can provide new opportunities for Australian exporters to tap into production networks in the region; the promotion of greater certainty for Australian service suppliers and investors including through enhanced protection for Australian investors in ASEAN countries; and the provision of a platform for ongoing economic engagement with ASEAN through a range of built-in agendas, economic cooperation projects and business outreach activities.
Its potential impact on trade differs according to the particular sectors being covered. The Agreement is considered to be most significant in the goods sector, since it is in this area that ASEAN has done the most work on regional integration. The Agreement will also come into effect gradually, partly because some ASEAN members need time to adjust their domestic frameworks of laws and regulations and partly because some areas of liberalisation will not be implemented fully until at least It is thus difficult to assess the likely full long-term impact of the Agreement, but it has clearly marked a major advance in the institutional relationship between the parties.
In relation to economic interactions overall, a detailed review of the Australian relationship with Southeast Asia, prepared by a commission organised by Asialink University of Melbourne , has identified a number of issues which have been obstacles to business interactions. The Asialink report argued that Australian businesses often lack sufficient awareness of the ASEAN countries and region and that this has inhibited the pursuit of investment from Australia.
Australian business people have concerns about the likely profitability of investments and about their capacity to withdraw funds when desired. The Asialink report, however, also pointed to promising areas for further trade and investment. Australia has substantial expertise and a competitive advantage in the area of logistics and Australian firms are already having success in this area. There are substantial potential opportunities in the field of energy security, which is a high priority for the ASEAN region.
There are opportunities for further cooperation in the field of food security. Australian involvement and support is also very welcome in the area of infrastructure development. The report suggested that given the great need for infrastructure in a number of ASEAN countries when only Singapore and Malaysia are considered to have adequately developed infrastructure further Australian initiatives in these areas would be desirable.
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Another early initiative of the Rudd Government proved more contentious. In a speech in Sydney on 4 June , Prime Minister Rudd stated that it was desirable to review the long-term vision for the architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. He announced that he had appointed a former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard Woolcott, to explore attitudes and approaches towards the proposal.
Richard Woolcott conducted extensive consultations in a number of countries about the concept. He later reported that while there was considerable interest in considering the need to review regional cooperation arrangements, there was no appetite to develop a distinctly new institution. The Australian Government continued to express an interest in exploring possibilities without seeking to present any fixed or final views on a destination.
The government sponsored a conference of regional experts and officials in Sydney in December to review regional cooperation issues. While there was reported to have been considerable interest in wider and enhanced cooperation arrangements, there was also criticism, including by a prominent Singaporean delegate Professor Tommy Koh , that a satisfactory consensus had not emerged. In the period during which the Australian proposals were being discussed, other developments among interested parties, particularly in the United States, saw increased interest in the issue of participation in regional dialogues.
Since Australia has continued to support the role of the expanded EAS and has sought to contribute to its emerging agenda. At the sixth EAS in November , agreement was reached to endorse a joint proposal by Australia and Indonesia to strengthen regional responses to natural disasters, working with other regional groupings. He commented:. One of the key advantages of the EAS is that it offers a venue for transparency and collaboration that, over time, can build confidence and trust, drawing on the spirit of cooperation that is already well-established in other ASEAN-centred forums.
The concept of common security is as much a habit as it is a concrete doctrine guiding specific actions. The habits of regular leaders-led dialogue on an agenda that includes security policy is itself inherently normalising …. Yet, while there will be many testing times ahead, it is clear we have made a solid start on the broader regional agenda. The EAS is still at an early stage, and while it was inaugurated in , its current membership including Russia and the US only dates from In the future, Australia hopes to see the EAS develop further its identity and role as a leaders meeting.
The Australian Defence Force takes part in multilateral military exercises such as the US-sponsored Cobra Gold exercises and has officer training programs with a number of regional states. ASEAN dialogues can also facilitate Australian involvement in other areas of security cooperation, including efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime. Much of this has been on a bilateral basis but Australia has also supported the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation an Australia-Indonesia bilateral initiative established in which has become a regional centre for law enforcement.
In an area of significant interest to ASEAN, Australia has given strong support to the process of change in Myanmar since the elections. The Australian Government has welcomed the process of reform pursued since the new government was inaugurated in March During the visit, Senator Carr announced that Australia would lift its autonomous travel and financial sanctions on Myanmar a decision which took effect on 3 July but an embargo on arms sales or transfers was maintained. Australia has also given support to ASEAN by pursuing a diplomatic effort to help persuade the European Union to lift permanently its sanctions on Myanmar.
Senator Carr stated:. I perceive the danger of Myanmar losing a lot of the lustre of their transition to democracy as a result of the sectarian tensions … and the widespread view that racial discrimination is allowed to be directed at a minority. There needs to be an authentic reconciliation across religious and ethnic divides. Foreign Minister Carr discussed the issue in a speech on August Senator Carr noted that Australia does not take sides on the territorial disputes and that it calls on countries to pursue their territorial claims and accompanying maritime rights in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
He suggested two models of how countries could successfully manage competing interests— the Antarctic Treaty had helped countries set aside sovereignty claims and concentrate on wide areas of cooperation, and joint development zones could also facilitate mutually beneficial development. But thinking creatively and constructively and examining models like these provide a path that deserves to be explored.
In line with this approach, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute hosted a conference on maritime confidence —building measures in the South China Sea with support from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which was held in Sydney on 12—13 August Ms Gillard said at a media conference on 20 November:.
We do not have a view about the territorial claims.
But we do have a view that the South China Sea questions need to be worked through peacefully and in accordance with international law. And we are very supportive of the work of ASEAN and China to develop a code of conduct for the South China Sea … [We] are talking about an area of the world that our shipping needs to go through to take our goods to the world. This is a very heavily used trade route for Australia and consequently what happens there in terms of maritime security is important to us.
And Myanmar is a good working example of an Australian policy settled on after consultation, and after recognition of what the ten nations of ASEAN were doing. As the previous discussion has indicated, Australia now has a very extensive relationship with ASEAN and interactions are proceeding in many simultaneous directions. Political communication has recently been enhanced by areas of joint cooperation and economic relations are expanding under the umbrella of the AANZFTA.
The Australia-ASEAN connection overall will be highlighted in when both sides mark the 40th anniversary of the multilateral relationship. A special commemorative leadership summit is being planned for October in Myanmar to mark the anniversary and to consider further ways to enhance relations.
Secretary del Rosario said that as part of the commemorative celebrations in , ASEAN and Australia will develop a Plan of Action for — that will bring in more opportunities to cooperate. The Plan is expected to be unveiled at the Commemorative Summit.