In any case, the philosophy behind gift-giving between Byzantines and Arabs hinged precisely on the exchange of rare and highly valued items. This was a highly political document, and highly unusual in its form, since it incorporated for the first time an oath by the emperor; in any case, the emperor was seeking to form a firm alliance with Robert Guiscard, cemented with a marriage alliance. In the late twelfth century, expensive silk cloth was given as a forced present to Frederick Barbarossa to buy peace, while an annual gift of 40 pieces of Theban silk was promised to the Sultan of Iconium.
The latter had no immense economic value, but did carry the usual symbolic value. The privilege to the Venetians issued by Alexios I in and its subsequent confirmations do not explicitly mention silks, but these may be subsumed in the roga accruing to the office of protosevastos , promised to the Doge. Almost none of the imperial privileges of the thirteenth or fourteenth century, that is, after the fall of Constantinople in , mentions such gifts. An exception is the chrysobull to the Genoese, issued by Michael VIII in , which does retain the gifts promised by Manuell, although this may be just formulaic.
For one thing, it signals the end of anything that might resemble the prohibition of the export of imperial silks, and so, also, of the usefulness of these silks in political relations. Secondly, it is a marker of the different conditions that prevailed in Mediterranean commerce in the thirteenth century and after, conditions that resemble an international market, where economic forces played a much greater role than before as integrating mechanisms, and also conditions in which the intervention of the state played a different role than before.
Science, Medicine and French Colonialism in Old-Regime Haiti
It is one of the two most interesting items on the list of forbidden commodities of international commercial exchange, in part because the prohibition seems to have been in force longer than for wheat. It was, of course, easier to enforce this prohibition, since the manufacture of highest quality purple silk was controlled, indeed almost an imperial monopoly, in the tenth century. It is also interesting because highest-quality silk is the item that most clearly shows the interrelationship between political and economic factors and interests in a Mediterranean in which the expansion of trade had not yet broken down state policies that had been meant to safeguard the interests of the state, political primarily and economic in the second instance.
The active economic exchange which had been developing in the Mediterranean since the eleventh century may have reduced, relatively speaking, the importance of items of high prestige; after all, one could always make substitutes, cheaper and thus affordable by a larger number of clients, as the Venetians did with some objects of the minor arts. It is well known that in the thirteenth century Venetians manufactured semi-luxury products, such as glass medallions of saints, emulating Byzantine cameos, or miniatures under crystal, which mimicked Byzantine enamels and found customers in the unified market that the Mediterranean was becoming.
There was, thus, commodification of artistic production. Good quality silks were, in the eleventh-twelfth centuries, produced in Thebes, Corinth, Andros and elsewhere, and were exported by Venetians and Genoese, primarily the Venetians. The prestige value of imperial vestments no doubt remained in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, but the larger market could be satisfied with products where monopoly no longer obtained.
This is even more clearly the case with the commodification of silk in the thirteenth century, when Venice developed its own silk industry, producing silks along a spectrum of quality. Liutprand of Cremona gives us a first clue: through the activities of individual merchants, in his text Venetian and Amalfitan merchants, who managed to export forbidden silks and sell them in the marketplaces of Italy.
An economic process, therefore: there is a market, and the entrepreneur finds ways of meeting the demand, at least up to a point. But the Byzantine state itself facilitated the process. None of the privileges granted to Italians in the eleventh and twelfth centuries mentions the prohibition of the export of imperial or high quality silks, or any restriction on silk exports, such as those that had been in place at earlier times, in the treaties with the Bulgarians and the Rus.
It might be argued that this was so because the state still controlled the supply of highest quality silks in any case, although I do not think there is sufficient or compelling evidence for such an argument. Byzantine governmental control and monopoly ended, through a combination of market forces the pressure of western merchants - as I believe the Genoese request of must be understood and imperial decision, that is, the privileges. After , the entire situation changed, since the presence of western merchants on Byzantine soil became massive and the opening of Central Asia to Italians with the Pax Mongolica led to importations of Asian silks and since the Byzantine silk industry declined, and was partly replaced by the silk industry of Latin-occupied Greece in the thirteenth century and less so in the fourteenth.
Occasionally, it was remembered: in , the chrysobull of Michael VIII to the Genoese prohibited the export of gold and silver, save by imperial permission, except for minted Tatar or Seljuk dinars whose export was allowed. The most important such category consists of foodstuffs, mostly bulk products: olive oil, wine, cereals and garum.
For a long time, until perhaps the eleventh century, the conditions probably did not exist for massive exports of foodstuffs. On the supply side, the Byzantine agrarian economy was not yet so developed as to produce sufficient foodstuffs for extensive exports. True, the agrarian economy had entered a virtuous cycle probably in the early ninth century, as conditions of relative safety were slowly re-established in various areas.
But the increase in agricultural production went hand in hand with a population increase, 47 as it did in western medieval Europe; and that means that increases in production were absorbed by the rising population. Surpluses did exist; but concomitantly, the urban population rose, thus creating a higher internal demand that had to be met and was successfully met, as is testified by the fact that cereal prices remained relatively stable in the middle Byzantine period, except, always, for momentary crises when extreme natural phenomena or some other calamity created famine conditions.
On the demand side, there was no effective market, for various reasons. It does not seem that the Arab world had great need of Byzantine alimentary products, at least not on a large scale, and except for specific situations for example, when cities were under siege. In western Europe, the same phenomena of increased production and perhaps productivity along with a rising population existed.
The European economy had not yet become sufficiently differentiated to have need of relatively small suppliers, such as the Byzantine ones might potentially be. Most importantly, there was not yet an integrated Mediterranean market, with product specialization, or with those trade mechanisms that would make it economically sensible to exploit all available and potential sources of supply, that is, create conditions that would match the supply to the demand across regions.
Such a policy was predicated on an integrated internal market coupled with the possibility of occasional purchases of foodstuffs from abroad, as need arose. It is not by chance that in the middle period, until the 12th century, we have much more information about merchandise and foodstuffs in particular coming into the Byzantine Empire than about exports. The purpose of the policy was to safeguard the interests of the consumer in times of high demand for foodstuffs; the interests of the merchant did not enter into the calculation, nor, in fact, did those of the native grower, who might, caeteris paribus , have found a higher price in an export market.
The purpose of this protectionist policy was met until the twelfth century, but almost by default, for the reasons I have detailed. But this is speculation. In point of fact, we know of no instance where such prohibition occurred in reality. We do, on the contrary, know of a few cases where foodstuffs were exported by that little known group, the Byzantine provincial merchant, whose activities do not seem to have been regulated by the government. Italian merchants, Venetians, Pisans and Genoese, bought wheat in Halmyros, which had become a major center for the grain of Thessaly and western Greece.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Byzantine lands exported wheat, oil, wine, silk, mastic. Here, again, it was the foreign merchants, the Venetians, the Genoese and others who bought and resold merchandise, the Byzantine merchants who may have cooperated with them, and the Byzantine producers through their commercial activities who opened up the trade in these foodstuffs.
But the Byzantine government provided the legal basis for such activity. Only the chrysobull of to the Genoese excluded Rossia and Matracha from the list of places where the Genoese ships could sail, unless they received special and specific imperial permission. Byzantine monopoly on the import of grain from this area continued in practice. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, trade within the Byzantine Empire was very active, and, while there was government involvement since the state exacted a transactions tax and various other duties, there was no state intervention.
The measure failed, and no state intervention in the grain trade, even in Constantinople, is attested in the twelfth century. Nevertheless, we hear of no particular problems in provisioning, and the price of grain seems to have remained stable; at a time of increasing urbanization, this suggests both increased production and improved mechanisms of distribution. In the absence of shortages, there was also no pressing need to forbid the export of grain. Indeed, the presence of privileged Italian merchants both gave greater impetus to the already active trade and, in turn, further promoted freer and cheaper trade conditions; at least insofar as the Venetians were concerned, those Byzantines who traded with them were also exempted from the transactions tax.
Finally, it is also probable that grain exports were not yet significant enough to worry the Byzantine state. Although it was in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that privileges to western merchants in Byzantine lands proliferated, the structures that support a free and active commerce, the mechanisms that lower the transaction cost to the merchant, were really set in place during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and that not only in the Byzantine empire but all over the eastern Mediterranean.
We can see them too in the special provisions made for the resolution of disputes involving foreign merchants. All of these mechanisms developed in the entire eastern Mediterranean region and North Africa, and created the conditions for the efficient exchange between trade regions. We can also see these mechanisms in the relaxation, indeed the absence, of controls regarding the export of foodstuffs and other forbidden commodities. This last point can be made for the Byzantine Empire; it is for others to say whether it holds for other parts of the eastern Mediterranean.
Histoire du sucre (Outremer)
With the treaty of Nymphaeum, in , Michael VIII allowed the Genoese to buy and export freely and without paying any duty all commodities except gold and silver , specifically including foodstuffs and grain. The emperor allowed the Venetians to export Byzantine wheat except to enemy lands only when its price in Constantinople was below 50 hyperpyra per kentenarion that is, in times of plenty, when wheat was cheap , a price which in became hyperpyra per kentenarion , there to remain throughout the Palaeologan period.
In , in a moment of great dearth, the Genoese were not allowed to export any Byzantine cereals at all - a prohibition lifted in Venetians, Genoese, eventually Ragusans, bought and exported Byzantine wheat even when its price was higher than that established in In fact, the grain trade within the Byzantine Empire and outside it was quite free.
At times, after the late thirteenth century, there were points of acute crisis, indeed famine conditions, which undoubtedly influenced some of these measures. Furthermore, the international grain market had changed, as the Byzantine territories and the Black Sea had become a prime source of provisioning for Italy.
Grain of this provenance became important for the ever-needy Genoese market after , while in , when there was severe scarcity in Italy, the Venetians were able to buy sizeable quantities of wheat form the Black Sea area and import it to the west, realizing high profits. It was impossible for a weak Byzantine state to impose true controls; there remained the protectionist intent, in a situation where international trade was much less regulated than in the past.
Here, the protection of the consumer, the protection of the Byzantine producer and the protection of the Byzantine merchant came up against the two principles which governed the policies of Italian merchants, that is, the people who had integrated the Mediterranean market; they desired freedom of trade for themselves, and adverse conditions of trade for everyone else. That is to say, on the one hand there were efforts to impose monopolies, and on the other hand these monopolies were based on privileges which established freedom of trade for particular groups of merchants.
The trade of the eastern Mediterranean in the thirteenth to the mid-fifteenth century was greatly influenced by these two demands, obviously in conflict when more than one state was involved. The two demands can be seen in the efforts of the Venetians and the Genoese to acquire trade monopoly in the Byzantine Empire, and especially in the Black Sea area. Thus, for example, the treaty of Nymphaeum, as well as that of , granted the Genoese quasi-monopoly in the trade of the Byzantine Empire although Pisan merchants were also allowed to operate , including the Black Sea area.
At the other end of the Pontic area, in , the emperor of Trebizond Alexios I gave the Venetians the same privileges enjoyed by the Genoese. On the other side, the Venetians argued for the freedom of the seas, a statement not in favor of free trade generally, this is not the World Trade Organization, but rather for freedom for themselves to trade in this area. On the evaluation of rum, arrack and kirsch with the help of the exhaustive test [ this should be easily ILL requestable ]. About the arrack extraction from molasses.
Rose L. The alcohol and rum production in Costa Rica. Schaffer E. The grog sample, a tool for evaluating rum and arrack. Wollny G. Wrede F. Spirit usind. The Rum distilleries overseas and in Germany. On the question of the assessment of foreign rum and Arrak. Ester number, abundance and quality of rum and arrak types of trade [here is something page these two did together on vacuum distillation of beverage stuff.
It looks like Curt Luckow wrote lots of abstract for this journal and may have been a major German thinker. Distillation of molasses for making tafias and rums. About the occurrence of amines in arrak and rum. Studies on the composition of the rums of Martinique. Deutscher Rum, Chem. Microbiological about Arrak fabrication in Batavia. About rum fermentation. About the distinction between Jamaikarum and Kunstrum. Note about the molasses fermentation on the Bonin Islands, Austro-Hungarian magazine for sugar industry and agriculture. For the knowledge and evaluation of rum, Rumverschnittenund Kunstrum.
A new way to judge rum and Arrak. On the evaluation of rum, arrack and kirsch with the help of the exhaustive test. Ester number, abundance and quality of rum and arrak types of trade. The fabrication of Indian rums. Computing with proof gallons and proof grades. The history of rum. Berichte vom Rum-Markt. Kompass , conglomeration Reports from the rum market.
Le rhum. The rum. Le Rhum.
The new Gault and Millau guide. Baraud J. Industrie Alimentaires et Agricoles 80 ; rev. The higher alcohols and the light esters of rums and apple brandies Les alcools et ales des eaux-de-vie de canne et de pomme. English America, or have a clear description of all these countries and islands, so the Crown England in western India are responsible and subject: that they have learned from time to time the French and English of the cursed potion known as Rum, Rumbullion, or Ribtdevil, Mortteufel, even more so than Weinhefen-Brantwein, is called and stripped of all the uncleanliness of sugar and sugar cane, Drinking liquor and liqueur.
Mode de fabrication du rhum, French Pat. Method of making rum. History of sugar cane and rum. French overseas riches, sugar cane and rum. Charpentier De Cossigny J. Brief on the manufacture of sugar spirits. Response to the intergroup alcohol-alcoholic drinks questionnaire. Comite national Interprofessionnel du rhum. Rum, French definitions. Cousins H. Agricultural and Technical from the sugar industry experimental station in Jamaica. Davies J. West Indies Sugar Technol.
Use of dry yeast in Jamaican rum distilleries. Direction Des Douanes. Customs Direction. Foreign Trade Statistics of Overseas Departments. Dormoy Estienne. The sugar economy of the overseas departments. Federation nationale des producteurs de rhum. Rum in the Common Market. Fellenberg Th. About the Jamaika rum and its higher alcohols.
Histoire du sucre (Outremer) - AbeBooks - Jean Meyer:
Gaber A. Die Fabrikation von Rum, Arrak und Cognac. The fabrication of rum, arrack and cognac. Harman C. Les Antilles.
Collection Life autour du monde. West Indies. Life collection around the world. The production of rum in India, Bulletin of the newest and most worth knowing from the natural sciences. Herzfeld A. NF 20 , p. Report on the attempts to present rum-like products from beet juice, molasses and raw sugar, Journal of the Association for the beet sugar industry of the German Reich.
Agricultural and technical in particular on rum production from the experimental station for sugar industry in Jamaica, Austrian-Hungarian magazine for sugar industry and agriculture. Recent work on rum manufacturing. Rum from British West Indies. Alten Hofen G. The competitive situation on the German rum market. Fedders and Dubick. Noch einmal : Die Wettbewerbssituation auf dem deutschen Rum-Markt, Branntweinwirtschaft 1o5 , no 2o, p. Once again: The competitive situation in the German rum market. Federal Monopoly Administration for spirits for the import of rum.
- Freely available?
- Travels of William Bartram.
- Steam Community :: Noddus?
- Thurgood Marshall: From His Early Years to Brown.
- How Many Miles to Basra? (Oberon Modern Plays).
Beitrag zur Rumuntersuchung, Pharm. Contribution to the Rumuntersuchung. Branntweinwirtschaft Small request in the Bundestag for the re-admission of Kunstrum and Kunstarrak. Labat P. Nieuwe Reizen naar de Franse Eilanden van America. Amsterdam : B. Lakeman, Part II Tweede Deel , 4o4 p. New Travel to the French Islands of America. Le Rumeur G. Enchantment of the West Indies-Knowledge of the Islands. Rectifier adapted to a distillatory apparatus for making rums. Malignac G. Average consumption of pure alcohol decreases. Marbeau P. Librairie Louis Arnette, , p.
The industrial alcohol and beverage alcohol in France. Marillier Ch. Distillerie agricole et industrielle-levurerie, sous-produits. Agricultural and industrial distillery-yeast, by-products. Mariotti F. Mariotti, 12 p. Miot P. The economic regime of alcohol. Micko K. By subscribing, you receive periodic emails alerting you to the status of the APAR, along with a link to the fix after it becomes available.
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