Manual Der Bombenkrieg 1939 bis 1945 in Düsseldorf (German Edition)

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It was only in early when the original population was reached again. Numerous historical buildings where destroyed by the attack. Almost all have been reconstructed:. The victims of 27 November are remembered in Freiburg by various memorials and regular commemorative events. November It bears the inscription: " built on the site of the Bertoldsbrunnen of which was destroyed in The city of Freiburg commemorates the event with a wreath laying ceremony and other events.


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On the fiftieth anniversary an oratorio in Freiburg Minster, a commemoration ceremony as well as an exhibition of the City Archives took place. Furthermore, the Hosanna bell of Freiburg Minster rings on each anniversary at the time of the air raid. On the fiftieth anniversary city government and the Sparkasse Freiburg issued a commemorative medal with an image of the statue of the drake in the city park on the reverse. The composer Julius Weismann processed in his choral work with soloists and orchestra Op. Gruesome sight of dead; among the ruins are often wreaths or more often crosses with inscriptions - people who are buried there.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Walter Vetter gives an estimated number of Band 3: Von der badischen Herrschaft bis zur Gegenwart. The Conferences at Washington, —, and Casablanca, P Studien zur Architektur und zum Kirchenbau des Historismus in Deutschland. Von Freiburg in den Schwarzwald. Freiburger Monumente im Early in the war, at least, American officers were also very wary of the ethical problems that resulted from indiscriminately bombing civilians. This would change by The following quotes reflect American attitudes toward and criticism of area bombing as it was practiced by the RAF.

It had generally been assumed that aerial bombardment would quickly shatter popular morale, causing deep civilian reactions. The progress of this war has tended to indicate that this expectation was unfounded. These facts are significant beyond their psychological interest. They mean that haphazard destruction of cities - sheer blows at morale - are costly and wasteful in relation to the tactical results achieved. Attacks will increasingly be concentrated on military rather than on random human targets.

Unplanned vandalism from the air must give way, more and more, to planned, predetermined destruction. More than ever the principal objectives will be critical aggregates of electric power, aviation industries, dock facilities, essential public utilities and the like. The American policy of precision bombing caused conflicts with the British, who considered it a waste of airmen's lives, resources, and time. However, despite sometimes heated disagreement between American and British bomber commands, both sides did their best to present a unified front in support of the war effort.

In particular, American generals Carl Spaatz and Henry "Hap" Arnold made every effort to cooperate with their British counterparts, regardless of their doctrinal differences. This determination to present a united front on the subject of bombing was evident in a compromise statement released after the Casablanca Conference in early In his book Bomber Command , Max Hastings explains that because Churchill was able to get the invasion of Europe postponed until , he felt obliged to drop his complaints about the American practice of precision bombing, which he believed diluted the effectiveness of the Allied bombing campaign against Germany.

Bombing remained the only offensive weapon by which to carry the fight to the Germans. The statement released at Casablanca affirmed that "the primary object [of the CBO] will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The American doctrine of precision bombing thus would be intact throughout and , while the British simultaneously would pursue their area bombing campaign. Into the late summer and fall of , American confidence in the ultimate effectiveness of precision bombing was as strong as ever. Unfortunately, however, American belief in the viability of precision bombing was deeply shaken after the two costly raids on the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt.

Precision bombing raids on key sectors of German industry would continue, but these would now be carried out simultaneously with area bombing raids.


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This change of direction drained considerable resources from the precision bombing campaign, which was unfortunate given evidence that suggests continued attacks on vital industries, particularly oil and ball-bearing production, could have ended the war in or Of all Germany's war-critical industries, ball-bearing production was the most centralized, and also one of the most critical to the German war effort.

Without an adequate supply of ball-bearings significant portions of German armaments production would grind to a halt. Allied intelligence had determined that the factories at Schweinfurt produced roughly half of all the ball-bearings used by the German army. The first raid on Schweinfurt took place on August 17, During the raid 60 bombers were shot down out of of the bombers sent on the mission. Although the Americans had been stunned by their losses in the first raid on Schweinfurt, the results had demonstrated that the damage to German war capacity was too consider able to ignore.

A second raid therefore took place on October 14, However, of the planes sent to Germany 60 were shot down and another 17 were severely damaged. Adding insult to injury was the fact that Arthur Harris contributed directly to the "defeat" of American precision bombing doctrine at Schweinfurt. Harris had been ordered to support the American daylight attacks with night-time raids by the RAF. Instead, Harris, who detested precision bombing, refused to send his bombers to Schweinfurt, which allowed the Germans to recover and disperse ball-bearing production.

RAF bombers would not attack Schweinfurt until February , by which time they were far too late to have any effect. Within weeks after the Schweinfurt raid, opinion within the Eighth Air Force had shifted in favor of adding nighttime area bombing to the American air offensive. General Ira Eaker, until this point a stout defender of the policy of targeted bombing wrote to Hap Arnold "I am concerned that you will not appreciate the tremendous damage that is being done to the German morale by these attacks through the overcast, since we cannot show you appreciable damage by photographs.

Other changes soon followed. Individual planes were no longer allowed to drop their bombs upon sighting the target. Now, all of the bombers in a formation would drop simultaneously following the signal of a lead plane. This was not precision bombing any longer, it was pattern bombing of a large area. Bombardiers were also allowed to drop their bombs through overcast skies and no specific sighting of the target was necessary.

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American officers would participate fully in the British campaign against German cities, a campaign that many of them had dismissed only months earlier. After the war, the German Minister for Armaments Production, Albert Speer, professed shock that "vast but pointless area bombing" was being continued in favor of highly effective precision bombing. Schweinfurt: The Third Reich in Ruins. The Schweinfurt Raids. Bomber Command C-in-C Arthur Harris, and others within the British bombing establishment had energetically resisted any attempt to subordinate their offensive area bombing campaign to tactical necessities.

However, by spring of Harris' continued claims that he could end the war via area bombing had not panned out. In fact, as Max Hastings notes, the five-month campaign to bomb Germany into capitulation by repeatedly striking Berlin, had been a complete failure. Between April and July , the tactical bombing of German transportation lines, air bases, and military installations was stepped up in preparation for the invasion of Europe.

However, certain war-critical industries, like oil, also were the target of Allied especially American air assault. The potential of the precision bombing of German industry to be a war winning weapon was again illustrated in spring when General Carl Spaatz was finally allowed to undertake his "Oil Plan" against Germany's synthetic oil production facilities; this after fighting a lengthy battle against Arthur Harris and other area bombing advocates simply to get permission to try out his plan.

On May 12, , and again on May 28th and 29th, Spaatz' bomber formations hit synthetic oil plants in central and eastern Germany. As a result of these attacks, "petroleum available to Germany fell from , tons in March, to , tons in May, and , tons in June. The Luftwaffe's supplies of aviation spirit fell from , tons in April, to 50, tons in June, and 10, tons in August.

By the late summer of the Luftwaffe lacked the fuel to fly anything like its available order of battle. Despite the success of the Oil Plan, due to limitations in intelligence Spaatz could not effectively prove to his superiors that the precision bombing of Germany's synthetic oil industry was having a dramatic impact. Allied commanders therefore continued to demand that bombers be used primarily to support the advance of ground forces.

Furthermore, by late summer, German forces were falling back toward the Rhine River and it appeared that the war would be over in a very short time. Ironically, the success being experienced by the Allies created the conditions for a renewed area bombing offensive against Germany. German air defenses and radar in France and the Low Countries had been occupied or destroyed following the successful invasion. Allied airfields were also now well advanced toward the German border. It was now possible for bomber formations to strike deep into Germany with fighter support and without having to fly through hundreds of kilometers of German air defenses.

It was within this context of "impending" German defeat that the advocates of area bombing among the British Chiefs of Staff began agitating for renewing the assault on German civilian morale, in order to bring about a complete collapse of the Reich: "The time might well come in the not so distant future when an all-out attack by every means at our disposal on German civilian morale might be decisive.

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The method by which such an attack would be carried out should be examined and all possible preparations made. For his part, Bomber Command chief Arthur Harris was delighted with the change of policy. Churchill too, supported reverting to area bombing, writing to Harris, "I am all for cracking in now on to Germany all that can be spared from the battlefields. It is suggested that such an attack resulting in so many deaths, the great proportion of which will be key personnel, cannot help but have a shattering effect on political and civilian morale all over Germany.

By August , Harris and Bomber Command received permission to resume area bombing attacks on twelve German cities, when his planes were not needed elsewhere. With this the area bombing assault on Germany began anew and in the last quarter of alone, Bomber Command would drop more bombs on German cities than in all of Nevertheless, Harris would continue to protest any use of British bombers for purely tactical or "precision" raids on industry.

He remained focused simply on killing as many German cities as was possible:. The following memorandum quote from Winston Churchill reveals his full knowledge of the mass death and destruction wrought upon German cities by Allied bombing. It also represents Churchill's attempt to distance himself from the questionable ethical dimensions of the bombing campaign, despite Churchill's unwavering support for, indeed, demand for the area bombing of Germany. The sentences in bold print were removed from the final version of the memo.

Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing. I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.

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No instruction has been given to destroy dwelling houses rather than armament factories , but it is impossible to distinguish in night-bombing between factories and the dwellings that surround them. This statement appeared in U. Historian Richard Overy compiled a listing of the tons of bombs dropped over Europe inc. This tonnage was dropped predominantly on cities in area bombing raids, not in tactical attacks on infrastructure or war materiel industries. Even as late as , with Germany reeling and fighting almost completely within her own borders, the bombing of German cities proceeded apace.

Had the war continued until , the Allies were on track toward dropping a projected total of roughly 1,, tons of bombs. Year No. The quotes below are from a short defense of Great Britain's area bombing policy written by J. Spaight, an official in the Air Ministry at the time, and a man well placed to understand the rationale behind the decision to bomb German cities.


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It was the bomber aircraft which, more than any other instrument of war, prevented the forces of evil from prevailing. It was supposed to be the chosen instrument of aggression. Actually, it was precisely the opposite. Aggression would have had a clearer run if there had been no bombers—on either side.

And the greatest contribution of the bomber both to the winning of the war and the cause of peace is still to come. The matter was placed in the proper perspective by Mr. Churchill in his great speech at Ottawa on 30 December, It is doubtful whether this use of the air weapon by itself could win the war, but it is certain that we could not win without it'. From now on I shall return blow for blow, till I have broken this criminal and his works. Here I interrupt the Hitlerian flow of words to quote some which Mr.

Churchill used in his speech at the County Hall, London, on 14 July, , that is, nine months previously. We seek from them no compunction. On the contrary, if tonight the people of London were asked to cast their votes whether a convention should be entered into to stop the bombing of all cities, the overwhelming majority would cry "No, we will mete out to the Germans the measure, and more than the measure, that they have meted out to us".

There is not much moaning about it. We were not bombing her. We were most carefully abstaining from bombing her. What, then, was the use of Bomber Command? Its position was almost a ridiculous one.

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It seemed to be keeping clear of the war, keeping neutral, acting as if it had made a separate peace. Had it—horrible thought—been bitten by a bug from Eire? What was the explanation? It certainly looked as if the policy of Munich, of appeasement, were still being continued in this particular sphere of warlike activity, or inactivity. Hitler must have been a happy man, happier far than he is now, during that first winter.

In effect he had won a great psychological victory, or he seemed to have won it; perhaps here, again, fate smiled on him only to betray. Our failure to carry the war into Germany was the subject of a good deal of criticism in this country. Why were we dropping leaflets and not bombs? The Germans would have been more impressed by high explosives than even the best propagandist literature. It was a policy of 'kid gloves and confetti', said an important monthly journal. Another jest was that the Navy had taken to sending down leaflets instead of depth-charges in its hunt for submarines. These comments were the froth on the surface of waters of doubt and perplexity which were deep and wide.

There was serious criticism of our inaction. The Air Force, it was complained, was not being used for the purpose for which, so far as it was an offensive force, it had been created. Only when the German advance into the Low Countries and France began in May, , was our striking force of the air allowed to fulfill its function. On 27 January, , another newspaper, the Daily Mail , endorsed editorially the view put forward by its contemporary. It devoted a leading article to combating the suggestion of Mr. Amery and others that we should start the bombing of Germany.

We were fighting, the article said, for a moral issue and we should do nothing unworthy of our cause. It confused the issue by speaking of a choice between the deliberate bombing of women and children and not bombing at all. Actually, the choice was between bombing military objectives in Germany and not bombing them: a totally different matter. It began by referring to the assurance given to the President of the United States that the Air Force had received orders limiting bombing to strictly military objectives and went on to state that His Majesty's Government 'now publicly proclaim that they reserve to themselves the right to take any action which they consider, appropriate in the event of bombing by the enemy of civil populations, whether in the United Kingdom, France or in countries assisted by the United Kingdom '.

We chose the better, because the harder, way. We refused to purchase immunity—immunity for a time at least—for our cities while those of our friends went up in flames. We offered London as a sacrifice in the cause of freedom and civilisation. Retaliation was certain if we carried the war into Germany. There was no certainty, but there was a reasonable probability, that our capital and our industrial centres would not have been attacked if we had continued to refrain from attacking those of Germany. No doubt some readers will say that I am making too big an assumption here and that Germany would have raided London and our provincial towns in any event.

Perhaps so; I can only put on record my own belief that she probably would not have done so, partly because it would not have suited her military book, partly because she was afraid of the long-term consequences. She would have called a truce if she could from the cross-raiding by British and German bombers when it did begin; she did call one, in effect, whenever she saw a ghost of a chance.

It simply did not pay her, this kind of air warfare. Humanitarian considerations had nothing whatever to do with the matter. Yet, because we were doubtful about the psychological effect of propagandist distortion of the truth that it was we who started the strategic offensive, we have shrunk from giving our great decision of May, , the publicity which it deserved. That, surely, was a mistake.

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It was a splendid decision. It was as heroic, as self-sacrificing, as Russia's decision, to adopt her policy of 'scorched earth'. Our Soviet allies would have been less critical of our inactivity in if they had understood what we had done. We should have shouted it from the house-tops instead of keeping silence about it. It could have harmed us morally only if it were equivalent to an admission that we were the first to bomb towns. It was nothing of the sort.

It has been a consequence—the logical consequence—of that new power that areas which had hitherto been immune from the ravages of war should no longer be left in the enjoyment of their ancient peace. Man is a pigmy beside the robots of scientific destruction which he has created And it is these monstrosities, these half human half-devilish monstrosities, which get themselves born, somehow, in the battle-towns.

That is the grim fact which makes those towns fit brand for the burning. Enhanced Typesetting: Enabled. Page Flip: Enabled. Language: German. Amazon Music Stream millions of songs. Amazon Advertising Find, attract, and engage customers. Amazon Drive Cloud storage from Amazon. Alexa Actionable Analytics for the Web. Sell on Amazon Start a Selling Account.

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